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HEIDEGGER AND THE 'END OF ART'
Robert Sinnerbrink
IN liN IIITEKWOKI) to Martin Heidegger's 1936 essay, "The Origin of
the Work of Art", one finds a surprising endorsement of Hegel's
thesis on the end of art. 1 Hegel makes this controversial claim in his
monumental Lectures on Fine Art, delivered in Berlin during the 1820S,
in which he states that, in the modern world, "art counts no longer as
the highest mode in which truth fashions an existence for itsclf".2
Despite his antipathy to Ilegel, I-leidegger accepts Hegel's diagnosis,
remarking that Hegel's judgment on the end of art "remains in force
[in Geltung]" for us in modernity.J Whether great art is dead or might
yet return is, for Heidegger, a question that remains historically
undecided, depending less on us than on the inscrutable destiny of
Being in the epoch ofglobal technology.J
Julian Young has argued that while Heidegger endorses Hegel's
account of great art, and agrees that great art in modernity is at an
end, he rejects Hegel's view that such art could no longer return
historically. Heidegger claims instead that only the return of great
art, rather than philosophy, can enable us to confront the nihilism of
the modern age.' In what follows, I shall explore Heidegger's
apparent endorsement of Hegel's 'end of art' thesis: his embracing of
a quasi-Hegelian 'Greek' paradigm of great art as a non-metaphysical
mode of truth-disclosure that provides an antidote to the 'nihilism'
of philosophical aesthetics. ThiS raises the question of the status of
modern art within Heidegger's philosophy of art. While Heidegger's
official position is that modern art is dead, reduced to what I shall
call aesthetic resource, certain forms of modern art, notably Van Gogh,
Cezanne, and Paul Klee, played a significant role in his philosophical
thinking on art. The question I wish to explore is whether Heidegger's
conception of modern art is compatihle with his diagnosis of the
end of art in technological modernity. I shall suggest, comra Young,
that Heidegger retains an Hegelian approach to the end of art in
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modernity, advocating poetic thinking, rather than philosophical
aesthetics, as that which envelops, rather than supersedes, modern
an construed as aesthetic resource.
The influence of Hegel's 'cnd of an' thesis is unmistakable in
Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of An"." Indeed, Heidegger
judges Hegel's aesthetics to be the highest achievement of
Western metaphysical discourse on an precisely because Hegel
gives urrerance ro "the end of grcat an as such".7 I shall therefore
commence with a brief interpretation of Hegcl's thesis on the end
of an before turning ro Heidegger's selecrive appropriation of
Hegel's reflections on the fate of art.
Hegel regards art as one of the three forms of absolute spirit;
cultural-historical practices disclosing the most binding truths of a
culture ("the Divine" or "the Absolute"). An is most truly art when it
takes on the same truth-disclosing role as religion or philosophy,
"when it is simply one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the
Divine, the deepest interests of mankind, and the most comprehensive
truths of the spirit".~ Yet in the modern world, an, like religion, no
longer plays the same culture-defining role as in previous historical
periods. This does not mean that an ceases ro exist historically, or that
anistic innovation is no longer possible. Art in modernity will
continue, and we of course hope that it "will always rise higher and
come ro perfection".') Nonetheless, art can no longer articulate
adequately the historical expericnce of modernity, precisely because it
remains a sensuous and singular way of disclosing truth.
This Platonic demotion of an as merely sensuous knowledge is
evident in Hegel's metaphysical narrative concerning the historical
development of Western art. For Hegel, art becomes increasingly
spiritualised in the course of its hisrory, commencing with the more
materially dependent, symbolic and classical an-forms of architecture
and sculpture, and culminating with the less materially dependent,
Christian-romantic an-forms of painting, music, and poetry. Although
less perfectly beautiful than Greek classical art, these romantic,
modern ans are 'higher' because they are capable of more complex
explorations of human subjectivity. The increasingly reflexive,
mediated character of modern experience, however, presents inherent
limits to what Christian-romantic art can communicate. For modern
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experience is increasingly defined by abstract forms of knowledge and
impersonal social institutions-universal law, scientific rationalism,
free market economics, governmental bureaucracy-as well as by a
fragmented sense of personal identiry and atomised social subjectiviry.
Consequently, Hegel argues, the social, cultural, and historical
conditions of moderniry are unfavourable to art. With the increasingly
reflexive and dichotomous character of modern experience, art, like
religion, is superseded by philosophy-a philosophy of art "for
knowing philosophically what art is".'" Hegel's Aesthetics thereby
self-reflexively announces the end of art and its supersession by
philosophy at the very time when the ontological vocation of art
collapses as a result of its conflicting autonomy and heteronomy.
Heidegger clearly endorses the Hegelian thesis that great art is
capable of binding a cultural communiry by the sensuous disclosure of
truth. This is evident in the 1936-37 Nietzsche lectures on the "Will to
Power as Art'"'' in which Heidegger praises Hegel for announcing
"the end of great art as such".J2 Agreeing with Hegel's diagnosis,
Heidegger remarks "that art has lost its power to be the absolute, has
lost its absolute power" in the modern age.'J In a decidedly Hegelian
tone, Heidegger observes that art "loses its immediate relation to the
basic task of representing the absolute, i.e., of establishing the
absolute definitively as such in the realm of historical man".'J In the
afterword to "The Origin" essay, moreover, Heidegger cites three
statements that succinctly formulate Hegel's thesis:
For us an counts no longer as the highest mode in which
truth fashions an existence for itself.'~
We may well hope that art will always rise higher and
come to perfectIOn, but the form of art has ceased to be
the supreme need of the spirit.'~
In all these respects art, considered in its highest
vocation, is ami remains for us ;I thing of the past. '?
Taken together, these statements claim that art, as a form of absolute
spirit, is no longer "the highest mode" in which truth is disclosed in
moderniry, for moderniry has reached the cultural-historical stage of
self-reflection in which art is superseded by philosophy.
Heidegger parts company with Hegel, however, over whether
the Hegelian judgment on the end of art is supposed to be final.
As Heidegger asks: "is art still an essential and necessary way in
which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical
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existence, or is this something that art no longer is?"\~ If art is no
longer an essential way of experiencing truth, understood in the
'Greek' sense of unconcealment [aletheia), then the question is why
this should have become the case in modernity. Heidegger's
answer is clear: art dies in modernity because of 'aesthetics'.
Aesthetic experience, centred on subjective feeling or expression,
supplants a more originary experience of art as disclosing truth
-of setting up a cultural-historical world and setting forth the
mysterious, self-concealing dimension of earth. Indeed, for
Heidegger, this ascendancy of lived experience [Erlehnisl is "the
element in whil:h art dies," a dying that "takes several centuries".\·}
II
Hcidcggcr's striking claim that art, in modernity, dies as a result of
aesthetics, demands further reflection. I turn therefore to
Heidegger's highly suggestive account of the history of aesthetics,
found in section thirteen of his 1936-37 lectures on "The Will to Power
as Art".21\ In the latter, Heidegger notes that "aesthetics" is the name
given, since Haumgarten's Aesthetica and Kant's Critique of
Judgment, to that branch of philosophy concerned with the experience
of beauty both in art and nature. Put simply, aesthetics treats the
artwork as "the object of aisthesis, of sensory apprehension in a broad
sense".2\ Aisthetike episteme is knowledge ofaisthesis: namely, "knowledge
of human behaviour with regard to sense, sensation, and feeling, and
knowledge of how these are determined".~~ Thinking comports itself
towards the true, human l:haracter and behaviour comport themselves
towards the good, while human feeling comports itself towards the
beautiful. Thus we have the true, the good, and the beautiful as the
objects oflogic, ethics, and aesthetics respectivcly.n
In the modern sense, Heidegger continues, aesthetics involves the
inquiry into our human state of feeling with regard to the beautiful as
evoked by art and nature. Beauty itself is understood subjectively in
the sense that it is simply that which, whether in nature or in art, can
bring forth or elicit the feeling ofaesthetic pleasure. Since art is under-
stood as bringing forth the beautiful in this manner, philosophical
meditation on art becomes aesthetics, oriented towards subjectively
experienced beauty grounded in the feeling of 'disinterested' pleasure.
According to the aesthetic consideration of art, the artwork is that
which can elicit such a universally valid subjective experience of
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beauty. It is posited as an aesthetically pleasing "object" for a "subject"
in the aesthetic-contemplative attitude, and this aesthetic relationship
of feeling, of contemplative pleasure, becomes paradigmatic for the
aesthetic approach to art from Kant to Nietzsche.
Heidegger thus singles out the emphasis on lived experience
[ErlebnisJ as the distinctive characteristic of the modern aesthetic
attitude.2' Lived experience becomes the "standard-giving source not
only for the appreciation and enjoyment of art but also for its
creation".2~This modern emphasis on subjective experience stands in
sharp contrast with the originary Greek experience of art as techne,
where the latter is understood as any means of poetic bringing-forth
along with the knowledge that makes this possible. To be sure, the
aesthetic approach to art can already be found with the Greeks, but
it only emerges, like modern aesthetics, "at that moment when their
great art and also the great philosophy that flourished along with it
comes to an end".2A
In other words, it is already during the age of Plato and Aristotle
that the philosophical disenfranchisement of art, to use Arthur
Danto's phrase, commences in earnest.~7 This disenfranchisement
proceeds through the exclusion of art from the realm of truth-
disclosure proper, as evinced in Plato's famous expulsion of the poets
and demotion of artworks to the level of simulacra.)~ In this sense,
the emergence of philosophical aesthetics during the Enlightenment
is the explicit manifestation of what was already implicitly at play in
Greek metaphysics. Art is disconnected from truth and knowledge,
relegated to the sensuous realm of mere appearance and degraded
imitation, or later, to the subjective realm of private feeling and self-
expression, and systematically subordinated as an inferior form of
knowledge.
Along with this philosophical disenfranchisement, we find the
inappropriate application to the artwork of the conceptual schema of
hyle-morphe, materia forma , or matter and form. This scheme is
derived, Heidegger argues, from our most hasic experience of things
as items of use;"? for it is in their usefulness for a given purpose
-for example the production of a tool for a specific use-that things
aCC"juire their definite relatIon of matter and form. This matter/form
schema deriving from produced equipment, Heidegger contends,
was subseC"juently mapped onto the ontological structure of things,
and has since become entrenched as the prevailing way of
understanding both things and works. Throughout the history of
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Western philosophical discourse on art, the matter/form schema
remains "the conceptual scheme deployed in the greatest variety ofways by all
art theory and aestbeties". \0 Matter and form become linked with the
general conceptual pair of form and content, form becomes correlated
with the rational and matter with the irrational, while the rational
becomes equated with the logical and the irrational with the illogical. In
the modern period, finally, the subject-object relation becomes coupled
with the form-matter distinction, as evinced in Kantian aesthetics.
Together, these conceptual elements comprise a metaphysical
framework of representation that has dominated Western
metaphysics-and the metaphysics of art-for millennia.
It comprises "a conceptual mechanism that nothing can withstand".'l
Heidegger thus aims to deconstruct this metaphysical framework of
matter-form relations, with the aim of fostering a non-metaphysical,
onto-poetic way of thinking about art. Art is no longer to be
understood through the subject-object relation, or as rooted in
subjective feeling or lived experience. Rather, art is capable of
disclosing truth, disclosing what beings are, and of bringing-forth
concealed aspects of our experience of world and earth.
One might well ask, however, what is wrong with the aesthetic
approach to art? Heidegger's response is to question the manner in
which the aesthetic approach passes over the essential nature of the
artwork in two interrelated ways: by deeontextualising the artwork
from its specific historical and cultural world; and by subjeetivising the
truth-content of artworks such that they become vehicles for
eliciting subjective feeling in a contemplating subject. As a result, the
artwork becomes a vehicle for aesthetic enjoyment, but therefore no
longer answers an "absolute need" in modernity-art becomes
disconnected from knowledge, subjectivised into an aesthetic
resource, and thus can no longer sensuously disclose truth.
Let us consider the implications of the decontextualisation of the
artwork. The aesthetic attitude requires, as Julian Young points out, a
bracketing of the connections between the work and world such that
we are left only with the object's purely formal, abstract qualities. 12
The context in which the work is meaningful, and which the work
makes meaningful in turn, is dissolved in the transformation of the
work into a purely aesthetic object. We enjoy the aesthetic state, as
Young aptly remarks, because "it is a form of stress relief, a moment
of lyric stasis in the midst of busyness, a holiday from the anxious
world of willing and working". \1 In Heidegger's cutting phrase, such
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'aestheticisco' art "belongs in the domain of the pastry chef".'4
Kantian disinterested pleasure degenerates into designer aestheticism;
art as aesthetic resource provides a palliative for our anxious being-in-
the-world. New age music, fashion photography. and interior design
perhaps exemplify the kind of <ontologically decadent) aestheticism
Heidcgger criticises in Western consumer culture.
How did this condition come about? J-1e,degger's answer points to
the second aspect of his rejection of modern aesthetics, namely the
subjectivisation of the artwork. Indeed, it is the modern metaphysics of
subjectivity that plays the crucial role in explaining the end of art
through aesthetics. Heidegger's central claim is that the advent of
the modern age, with its emphasis on the self-certainty of the human
cognitive subject, fundamentally transforms the manner in which
beings show up as intelligible. In modern metaphysics, commencing
with Descartes, the certitude of all Being and all truth "is grounded
in the self-consciousness of the individual ego: ego cogito ergo sum".JJ
From this perspective, "I myself, and my states are the primary and
genuine beings". JI, The self-certainty of the human cognitive subject
becomes the standard and measure for representing and defining the
intelligibility of all beings. Accordingly, meditation on the beautiful
in art now shifts towards "the relationship of man's state of feeling,
aesthesis" ,J7 from which philosophical aesthetics emerges as the
dominant paradigm for understanding the experience of art.
Connected with the formation of aesthetics, another historical
development emerges that contributes to the end of art in modernity:
the loss of any "binding" character to art, which becomes, through its
aestheticisation, a matter of subjective taste or arbitrary cultural
choice. Following Hegel, Heidegger claims that great art is great in
that it is an "absolute need"-it offers exemplary works that evoke a
sense of proper dwelllllg; great art calls upon us and evokes, in an
indirect manner, a sense of how we should live. It is not merely the
cultivated interest of a professional and social elite, nor a form of
distraction, relaxation, or entertainment, nor merely a subjectively
chosen option among a plurality of competing cultural choices.
Kather, great art refers to works that manifest a culture-defining,
community-binding, ontological disclosure of truth-it is great art in
this sense that begins to decline and disappear in the modern age.
Although Hegel argued that art is superseded by philosophy,
I want to suggest that Heidegger's version of the end of art points,
rather, to the transformation of art into an aesthetic resource. Great art,
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with its truth-disclosing power, disappears. Art loses its specific
character as a work, not in the modernist sense of reflexively
transcending the limitations of its own medium, but in the post-
modernist sense of becoming thoroughly assimilated into the global
system of the "culture industry".J~ Heidegger joins Adorno in
criticising the transformation of art into a technical resource deployed
for, among other things, private enjoyment, commercial entertainment,
institutional preservation, art-market exchange, advertising and
marketing, not to mention ideological manipulation. Heidegger's
rendering of the 'end of art' thesis thus remains significant as a way of
understanding the ironic deflation and subJectivisation of art in post-
modernity, an epoch in which the aestheticisation of everyday life in
consumer culture goes hand in hand with the disappearance of
autonomous art as a legitimate sphere of cultural activity. ") In sum,
the end of art occurs when art becomes an aesthetic resource
divorced from ontological truth, disconnected from community,
subjectivised into lifestyle choice, integrated into a technical system
of aestheticised experience, and overpowered by techno-scientific
rationalism as the definitive way in which truth is disclosed in
modernity.
III
Does this rather bleak thesis-the reduction of art into aesthetic
resource-imply that there is no place for modern art in Heidegger's
philosophy of art? Numerous remarks in Heidegger's post-war
writings give one the strong impression that art in modernity has
ontologically decayed into mere private Erlebnis or technical 'culture
industry' resource-and nothing else besides. AsJulian Young points
out,411 Heidegger describes abstract art as having its legitimate
function "in the domain of this techno-scientific world-construct";·'
modern art works are "the steering-steered [gesteuert-steurendenl
instruments of the cybernetic language of information exchange":)
Art no longer arises from an ethnic, cultural, or national world bur is
constructed and lead, rather, by scientific technoloh'Y, "the universality
of [our] ... world civilisation", with the result that the very essence of
great art disappears. J > Poetry has become subsumed within the
culture industry, instrumentalised into mere "literary produetion",44
while the dominance of film, the industrial-technological art form
par excellence, exemplifies the powerful hegemony of Western techno-
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rationalism, which Heidegger criticises as "the Europeani7.ation of
man and the earth [which] attacks at the source everything of an
essential nature".J' It is notable that Heidegger refers in this context
to Kurosawa's Rashomon, a film that, far from presenting the
"enchantment of the Japanese world", shows the incompatibility of
the East Asian sense of world and the "technical-aesthetic product of
the film industry":('
Despite Heidegger's evident scepticism, it is clear that at least
some modern artworks remain capable of a non-metaphysical mode of
truth-disclosure. Indeed. we find a clear endorsement, as I shall
presently discuss, of the truth-disclosing power of Van Gogh's
painting of peasant shoes, along with a surprisingly sympathetic
engagement with certain modern artists, namely Van Gogh,
Cezanne, Georges Braque and Paul Klee. So what is one to make of
the tension between Heidegger's official rejection of modern art as
ontologically decadent aestheticism, and his unofficial endorsement
of at least some modern art as capable of a poetic disclosure of truth?
Julian Young has suggested that this difficulty arises in Heidegger's
account of modern art because of his residual commitment to a
quasi-Hegelian, Greek paradigm of great art:7 I shall modify his
thesis by arguing that Heidegger also remains committed to a
transfigured version of the Hegelian overcoming of aesthetics, not
through the philosophical comprehension of what art is, but rather
through a recollective poetic thinking that could foster art as a "saving
power" in modernity. To develop this thesis, I turn to one of
Heidegger's most celebrated discussions of art, his description of Van
Gogh's Old Shoes with Law.
This short passage has given rise, in Young's amusing phrase, to
"a baroque foliage of secondary literature that has had progressively
less and less to do with Heidegger":R The overemphasis on this
passage, along with the celebrated "Greek temple" passage, has given
rise to the view that they provide the keys to Heidegger's thinking on
art. Heidegger's discussion of Van Gogh's painting, however, has little
to do with a general theory of art or even the 'true meaning' of this
particular artwork. To this extent Young's questioning of the scholarly
overestimation of this passage is sound. Young even argues that the
overestimation of the Van Gogh passage is misplaced because it is
simply "a testament to Heidegger's early love of Van Gogh but
almost completely irrelevant to, indeed, ... inconsistent with, the real
thrust of the essay":'}
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As we have seen, the choice of a modern work as an exemplary
case of great art, in the ontological sense of truth-disclosure, is
indeed inconsistent with Heidegger's general rejection of modern art
as lacking such truth-disclosing power. But far from being
irrelevant to the argument of the "Origin" essay, , want to suggest
that this poetic evocation of the being ofequipment and relationship
between world and earth disclosed by the work proves central to
Heidegger's claim that the work 'works' by thematising aspects of
our environmental context and concealed dImensions of our being-
in-the-world. In this respect, Hcidegger's poetic description of this
work serves more than a merely rhetorical purpose.~" Contra Young's
dismissal of this passage, , want to suggest that it provides an
important phenomenological, or rather phenomeno-poetical
demonstration of how a particular artwork 'works'. It provides a
performative enactment of the truth-disclosing power of the
artwork, and does so by showing the power of a work to reveal the
being of a very humble piece of equipment-a pair of old shoes.
The context of this discussion is Heidegger's account of the three
prevailing interpretations of the "thingness" of the thing: the thing as
bearer of properties, the thing as unity of a sensuous manifold, and
the thing as a unity of matter and form.~1 As earlier remarked, the
interpretation of the thing as formed matter derives from the
originary experience of things as items of use or equipment [Zellg}.~2
What, then, of the equipmenta/ity of equipment? Answering this
question requires that we turn to a (phenomenological) description
of the being of a piece of equipment "quite apart from any
philosophical theory".~l -'0 this cnd, Heidegger suggests "a pictorial
presentation"-Van Gogh's painting-that will assist in describing a
piece of equipment without theoretical prejudice, facilitating its
"visual realization" in a vivid pictorial image.~"
The discussion of the painting aims to describe the being of a
piece of equipment in respect of its utility, its handiness for use. This
usefulness must be sought in the everyday use of equipment, just
where we are least likely to notice the equipment as equipment
(unless the equipment 'doesn't work', in which case the complex web
of relational involvements within which this item is meaningful
suddenly becomes manifest). The Van Gogh painting, however, is
striking in that it offers no clue as to the context of this pair of shoes.
We cannot tell where these shoes are or to whom they belong; we
are simply presented with a pair of shoes against an indeterminate
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hackground. Despite that, Heidegger points to the poetic power
of the image to evoke the world in whIch this piece of equipment
is embedded (the harsh but dignified cycles of traditional rural
life), and the ordinarily hidden dimension of earth that is made
manifest through the image (the non-metaphysically or poetically
apprehended dimension of nature fphysisJ as self-concealing power
of emergence). Heidegger indicates the poetic power of Van Gogh's
painting through his own poetic reflection on what this painting is
capable of evoking:
From out of the dark opening of the well-worn insides of
the shoes the toil of the worker's tread stares forth. In the
crudely solid heaviness of the shoes accumulates the
tenacity of the slow trudge through the far-stretching and
ever-uniform furrows of the field swept hy a raw wind.
On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil.
Under the soles slides the luneliness uf the t1e1d-path as
evening falls. The shoes vibrate with the silent call of the
earth, its silent gift of ripening grain, its unexplained self-
refusal in the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded hy
the uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread,
wordless joy at having once more withstood want,
trembling before impending birth, and shivering at the
surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to
the earth and finds protection in the world of the peasant
~~
woman.
The point is not only that a painting such as this can provide us with
'poetic insight' into a now almost vanished world or originary
experience of earth. Rather, Heidegger suggests that it discloses what
this piece of equipment is in truth-it discloses the being of this
equipment, not merely its serviceability [Vienlichkeit} but its reliability
[Ver/lifilichkeitl (wherein the peasant's shoes, with their authentic
aptness, differ, presumably, from a pair of generic running shoes).
Indeed, Heidegger suggests here that this reliability of the peasant's
shoes, disclosed in the painting, is a more originary way of experiencing
equipment than the merely serviceable, utilitarian character of
anonymous, mass-produced goods, or even of useful equipment that is
simply available for use (which, interestingly, is how Heidegger
discusses the "ready-to-hand" character ofequipment in IJeing andTime).
Heidegger's point here, it should be noted, is not to provide a
theory of art in the traditional sense of an epistemologically motivated
account of the essence of art; an account that picks out those
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characteristics of art that would ensure the objectivity of aesthetic
judgments, or which specifies a set of criteria that would enable all
subjects in principle to arrive at a consensus of aesthetic judgment
concerning the validity of a work. Rather, Heidegger's aim is to
provide an "ontological" account ofwhat art is; not only an account of
the being of the artwork but also the manner in which art discloses
Being. The artwork works, in Heidegger's view, because it is capable
of sensuously disclosing what a being is in truth. Thus, in the case of
Van Gogh's painting, attempts to show how this artwork can evoke
and reveal phenomenologically (or phenomeno-poetically) the being,
or truth, of a particular being.
This reliability of the peasant woman's shoes (as distinct from the
mere usefulness of standard work-boots) is an integral part of the
cultural world she inhabits and its existential proximity to a more
poetically experienced sense of earth. Heidegger's contrast here is
between the poetic power of disclosure of this pair of shoes, which
reveal the reliability of equipment, and the "worldless" character of
"mere equipment", in which reliability dwindles and items ofequipment
consequently acquire their "boringly oppressive usualness".Sb As
Heidegger observes: "World and earth exist for her and those who
share her mode of being only here-in the equipment.... for it is the
reliability of the equipment which first gives the simple world its
security and assures the earth the freedom of its steady pressure".~7
In very simple terms, Heidegger's contrast between world and earth
is a non-metaphysical version of the traditional distinction between
culture and nature, where both are understood in an originary
'Greek' sense. Heidegger points to the power of the Van Gogh
painting to evoke this sense of the reliability of equipment, its truth,
as embedded within a (now rare) non-metaphysical experience of the
relationship between world and earth, or, expressed simply, a non-
exploitative relationship of dwelling between 'culture' and 'nature'.
In allowing the painting to evoke this sense of equipment
embedded in a particular configuration of world and earth, we
experience phenomenologically the disclosure of the truth of a
particular being. The artwork discloses "what the shoes, in truth,
are"; it shows us, in a pictorial manner, the Heing of a particular
being. sx We should note that Heidegger distinguishes here between
beings (shoes, people, equipment) and the Being of those beings
(the horizon of intelligibility in which these beings are disclosed in
their presencing for us). As Julian Young observes, we should be
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mindful that Heidegger's usc of the term "Ueing" or Sein is
ambiguous between (I) "being" in the sense of presencing, the horizon
of intelligihility in which beings [Seiende] are disclosed; and (2) "Being"
in the sense of concealment, un-intelligibility, the hidden source or
"ground" of such horizons of world-disclosure (of "being" in the first
sense). Interpretation of Heidegger is so difficult precisely because the
Heideggerian Sein remains ambiguous between these two senses of
b/Being (presencing and the concealed "ground" of presencing).'9 For
Heidegger, it is the play of this "ontological difference" between Heing
and beings that is fundamental to the truth-disclosure performed by
the work ofart. This bringing of beings into unconcealment is to reveal
their originary truth, the Greek sense of aletheitl. Van Gogh's Old Shoes
discloses the being of these shoes as equipment, belonging within a
particular configuration of world and earth. So we can say that here
there is "an occurring, a happening of truth at work".Nl The artwork
enacts a setting-into-work of the truth of a being.
In this case at least, we have a modern work of art that performs
the ontological truth-disclosure definitive of great art. Hut, as earlier
remarked, Heidegger consistently rejects the possibility that modern
art can be anything more than ontologically trivial. Heideggcr's
evocative description of Van Gogh's painting seems irreconcilable
with his seemingly total rejection of modern art, construed as mere
aesthetic resource. I would agree that Heidegger's alienation from
modern art, as Julian Young has argued, is largely due to his
commitment to a quasI-Hegelian 'Greek' paradigm of great art. bl
Indeed, it is no surprise that the famous 'Greek temple' passage in
the "Origin" essay is taken to exemplify Heidegger's philosophy of
art, since such an artwork very obviously exemplifies the essential
characteristics of such a paradigm. At the same time, however, it is
important to remember that there is no philosophical 'theory' of art,
in the epistemologically motivated sense discussed above, developed
in the "Origin" essay. Heidegger is not concerned to determine the
essential criteria belonging to works of art in order that they may
elicit objectively vaIJd aesthetic judgments. Rather, Heidegger
attempts to pursue a ontological meditation on the essence of art as
art, what makes an artwork a work capable of disclosing truth; a
meditation guided by the light of, and directed solely towards, the
question of Ueing.01 Nonetheless, what is striking here and
throughout Heidegger's later self-criticisms is the tension between
his claim to reveal the "essence of art", and hence provide some kind
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of ontological account of what art is, but also to pose the question of
the "riddle of art" in respect of the question of Heing, and thus leave
open the question of whether art has any kind of determinable
"essence" as such.~\
For all this it remains unclear how Heidegger's exemplary art-
works in the "Origin" essay-Van Gogh's Old Shoes, the Greek 'temple
at Paestum, and c.F. Meyer's poem "The Roman Fountain"--ean all
be regarded as examples of great art. Certainly the inclusion of the
Van Gogh painting, which is hardly culture-defining or community-
forming, suggests that Heidegger does not entirely endorse the Greek
paradigm of art. Hy the same token, it is clear that nearly all of
modern art would fail to qualifY as 'great' according to the Greek
paradigm. Heidegger is therefore either incoherently conflating
ancient and modern art, and effectively criticising modern art for not
being Greek, or else he must acknowledge that at least some modern
art is capable of the ontological disclosure of truth, in which case we
cannot say that art in modernity is SImply at an end.
Heidegger's strong endorsement of the quasi-Hegelian thesis on
the end of art thus reaches a crucial juncture. On the one hand,
Heidegger appears to dismiss all modern art as ontologically
decadent, mired within the triviality of subjectivist aesthetics; on the
other, he comes to realise that the Greek model of art must be
abandoned in favour of an approach more responsive to the
distinctiveness and plurality of modern art.(,.l This is what the later
Heidegger attempts to do, largely under the influence of Holderlin's
poetry, and inspired by his discovery of modernists such as Cezanne
and Paul Klee. Art is no longer understood through the Greek
paradigm, nor through the conflictual strife (Heraclitean po/emos)
between world and earth, but rather as evoking a sinh'Ular experience
of what the later Heidegger called das Ereignis-the mysterious
appropriative-event of Heing that first makes possible the horizon
of disclosure, or background sense of world, in which we always
already find ourselves. The (now defunct) paradigm of great art,
along with Heidegger's harsh rejection of modern art as aesthetic
resource, is thus abandoned in favour of a modest retrieval of those
cases of modernist art capable of evoking this unique, non-meta-
physical experience of Ereignis.
One of the most important modern artists in this respect is Paul
Cezanne. According to Jean Reaufret, Heidegger even remarked in a
1958 lecture that Cezanne's pathway was "the pathway to which,
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from its beginning to its end, my own pathway of thinking responds
in its own way"./'~ Above all, it was Cezanne's numerous paintings of
Mont Sainte-Victoire-with their progressively attenuated renderings
of rock, sky, and forest through thick planes of colour and contrasting
blank patches of canvas-that were astonishing precisely because of
their vivid evocation of the Ereignis-experience. The oscillation
between inchoate planes of colour and their resolution into a
recognisable world of mountains, light, and fields, a resolution
threatening always to dissolve once again into indeterminate patterns
of colour, visually renders the play of the (ontological) difference
between Heing and beings. Cezanne's works are exemplary cases of
how modern art might be able to show, to render visually, the
"vibration" or oscillation between intelligible beings and the event of
Being that occurs in the "worldmg of world".
Paul Klee is also revered as modernist artist capable of non-
aesthetic, post-metaphysical truth-disclosure. This is clearly evident
in Heidegger's reported intention, inspired by Klee's work, to write a
second part to the "Origin" essay.~6 Whereas Cezanne's objects or
landscapes, however attenuated and planar, are nonetheless
recognisable as objects or landscapes, Klce's art is far more
idiosyncratic, ambiguously occupying, as Klee put it, a "region-
between" representational and non-representational art./'7 Cezanne's
primal landscapes evoke the 1;'reignis-cxperience of a familiar sense of
world, now made strange and inhuman through the striking
oscillation bct\veen world and chaos. Klee's quasi-abstract, whimsical
works, by contrast, thematise the mysterious coming-forth of objects
out of concealment, and work through the evocation of fantasmatic,
indeterminate, dream-like worlds. In this respect, Heidegger remarks
that Klec's art properly begins what Cezanne's art prepares: an
Ereignis-experience of the poetic worlding of unfamiliar, fragmentary,
indeterminate worlds.
So at least in these cases, Heidegger acknowledges that modern
art has the power to evoke the Ereignis-experience, the "worlding of
world" concealed from our ordinary experience of beings. Modern
art can no longer be great, but it can, in singular instances, make the
event of truth-disclosure visible to us. Despite his forays into Klec
and Cbanne, however, J-1cideggcr never fully developed this
paradigm of non-metaphysical art. Rather, he ultimately remained
bound to the quasi-Hegelian, Greek paradigm of art as part of his
deeper confrontation with the metaphysical foundations of
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modernity. Presumably that is why Heidegger never wrote the
promised "pendant" to the "Origin" essay: the Greek and modern
paradigms remain inconsistent, and Heidegger never found a way to
resolve their opposition.
Heidegger's incomplete abandonment of this Greek paradigm,
however, should also have meant a modification of his radical
critique of the nihilism of technological modernity. For if some
modern art remains capable of disclosing truth, then the meta-
physics of subjectivity, and its manifestation in art as aesthetic
resource, cannot be as all-encompassing as Heidegger maintains.
Given that the horizon of our contemporary being-in-the-world is
supposed to be defined by the essence of technology-that is, by
the total disclosure of world as en-framing or Ge-stdl, and of beings,
including human beings, as available resources-then there must
surely also be modern art that discloses the truth of technological
modernity in such a way as to suggest a no longer metaphysical
mode of dwelling. Interestingly, Heidegger appeared to find greater
potential for such non-metaphysical truth-disclosure in East Asian
art, particularly Japanese art and the art of Zen Buddhism. rog Hut
apart from these notable exceptions, such art remains largely
absent in Heidegger's reflections on the riddle of art, or else is
relegated to the status of "worldless" aesthetic resource.
In this respect, Heidegger remains, despite his anti-metaphysical
orientation, faithful to the Hegelian paradigm of art. Heidegger
simply transfigures the Hegelian claim that art is superseded by
philosophy into the esoteric pronouncement that poetic thinking is
what shall subtly envelop art in response to its ontological degradation.
Heidegger, in his later period, seemed to become aware of this
difficulty, realising that his affirmation of some cases of modern art
comes into tension with his qualified endorsement of the Hegelian
thesis on the end of art. In a 1960 marginal remark, he comments
that his quasi-Hegelian statement that great art "dies" in the element
of subjective or lived experience [Er/ehnis} "does not say, however, say
that art is absolutely at an end".6~ On the contrary, that would only be
the case if modern art were to remain mired within the metaphysical
subjectivism of Erlehnis or li.ved experience. Much like Hegel,
Heidegger also maintains that we can hope that art will continue to
develop to its highest perfection; but this will only be possible by
overcoming metaphysical subjectivism-by overcoming 'aesthetics'
-in favour of a renewed experience of the sense of Being:
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"Everything depends on getting out of experience and into being-
there [Da-seinl, which means achieving an element for the 'becoming'
of art quite other than experience".711
The problem is that Heidegger also appeals to art as a "saving
power" in modernity, precisely to foster the overcoming of, or
recovery from, metaphysical subjecrivism; but modern art can only
play this role once already liberated from the deadening clement of
metaphysical subjectivism and its degradation of art into aesthetic
resource. So art is on the one hand at an end, dying because of its
subjecrivisation into aesthetic resource; on the other, art is a saving
power that will enable the overcoming of modern subjectivism and
its pernicious effects on art as such. However, this circularity in the
relationship between art and experience in modcrnity-the end of
art in metaphysical aesthetics and the overcoming of metaphysics
through non-aesthetic art--Does not seem ultimately coherent as an
attempt to think the ambiguous essence of art. The fate of modern
art thus remains a "riddle" for us, as Heidegger admits, since it seems
to have been instrumentalised into aesthetic resource, and therefore
lacks the transformative or "saving power" of archaic art, which
modern art nonetheless requires if it is to overcome metaphysical
subjectivism. But as Hegel clearly saw, such archaic art, or even its
romantic renaissance, remains unavailable in this disenchanted age.
For the prose of modernity has superseded the poetry of the archaic.
And with good reason, since the danger of resurrecting the
monumental work, construed as community-defining paradigm, is
that we risk affirming an "acstheticisation of the political", conflating
the disclosure of truth in the artwork with thc formation of the
political state as a collective work of art. 71
In this sense, Heidegger arrives at a final cndorsement of the
quasi-Hegelian 'end of art' thesis, which nonetheless remains
undecided, dependent neither on us nor on art, but on the
inscrutable history of Heing. Heidegger transforms the Hegelian
philosophical supersession of art in modernity into its tragic demise
through metaphysical subJectivism, the degradation of truth-
disclosing modern art into mere aesthetic resource. In a curious
Hegelian inversion, only poetic thinking can serve as the "saving
power" by enveloping art, retarding its ontological degradation, and
keeping open the possibility of a post-metaphysical mode of
dwelling. Far from rcvcrsing the determinism of Hegel's historical
thesis, however, Heidegger's rendering of the end of art in fact
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repeats its historical inevitability. For the end of art in modernity,
in Heidegger's view, is no contingent occurrence but rather a
fundamental symptom of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity
and its historical completion in the epoch of global technology.
I remark, in conclusion, that Heidegger's implicit commitment to
the historical inevitability of the end of art remains a serious
problem, since he at the same time insists that post-metaphysical art
can serve as a regenerative source, a poetic antidote to technological
nihilism. Such art, however, is either fully subsumed into the system
of aesthetic resources, or else remains inaccessible until the next
unforeseeable change in the historical disclosure of Being. Rather
than this unhappy impasse, one would think that a genuine openness
to the truth-disclosing potential of modern art, even in the age of its
technological disenfranchisement, would be more in keeping with
the best of Heidegger's thinking on art.
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